Mind Body Problem and Metaphysics: (Record no. 758068)

MARC details
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control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20260325141852.0
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020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 9781032457697
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE
Transcribing agency kul
082 ## - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER
Classification number 128.2
Item number WEI/M
084 ## - OTHER CLASSIFICATION NUMBER
Source of Number Colon Classification
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Weir, Ralph Stefan
9 (RLIN) 12491
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Mind Body Problem and Metaphysics:
Remainder of title An Argument from Consciousness to Mental Substance
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. New York:
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Routledge,
Date of publication, distribution, etc. 2024
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent xi, 177p.
440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE
Title Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy
9 (RLIN) 4193
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. This book evaluates the widespread preference in philosophy of mind for varieties of property dualism over other alternatives to physicalism. It takes the standard motivations for property dualism as a starting point and argues that these lead directly to nonphysical substances resembling the soul of traditional metaphysics.<br/>In the first half of the book, the author clarifies what is at issue in the choice between theories that posit nonphysical properties only and those that posit nonphysical substances. The crucial question, he argues, is whether one posits nonphysical things that satisfy an Aristotelian-Cartesian independence definition of substance: nonphysical things that could exist in the absence of anything else. In the second half, the author argues that standard and Russellian monist forms of property dualism are far less plausible than we usually suppose. Most significantly, the presuppositions of one of the leading arguments for property dualism, the conceivability argument, lead by parity of reasoning to the view that conscious subjects are nonphysical substances. He concludes that if you posit nonphysical properties in response to the mind-body problem, then you should be prepared to posit nonphysical substances as well. Mainstream philosophy of mind must take nonphysical substances far more seriously than it has done for the best part of a century.<br/>The Mind-Body Problem and Metaphysics will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and the history of philosophy.
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Mind
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Metaphysics
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Topical term or geographic name entry element Dualism
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Philosophy
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Source of classification or shelving scheme Dewey Decimal Classification
Koha item type Book
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Collection code Home library Current library Shelving location Date acquired Source of acquisition Cost, normal purchase price Total Checkouts Full call number Barcode Date last seen Price effective from Koha item type
    Dewey Decimal Classification     Non-fiction Dept. of Philosophy Dept. of Philosophy Processing Center 25/03/2026 Modern Book Centre, MBC/0862/2025 Dtd 26/02/2026 5175.27   128.2 WEI/M PHL4889 25/03/2026 25/03/2026 Book